“Theory Selection” from Thomas Kuhn’s Point of View

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Phd (Philosophy of Science and Technology), Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies

Abstract

This article is an attempt to explain and evaluate Thomas Kuhn's viewpoint on theory selection in natural sciences. Based on the dichotomy of discovery context-justification context, philosophers of science believe that since the process of discovery is not rule-governed, the process of theory choice, which is the context of justification, must inevitably be rule-governed; otherwise, the objectivity and rationality of science is lost. But Kuhn argued that the selection process is not rule-governed either, because the common selection criteria such as accuracy, scope, consistency, simplicity, and fertility do not function as precise and consistent rules by which a single choice is necessitated as a proof. The function of selection criteria is like that of values. Although they have an impact on selection, they do not entirely determine it. Moreover, values prepare the grounds for the intervening factors associated with the scientist’s life and manners and facilitate the possibility of differences of opinion among scientists. Does Kuhn, therefore, destroy the last bastion of objectivity and rationality of science? Is he a relativist or an admirer of irrationality? Kuhn never accepted such accusations.

Keywords

Strategy for Culture
Volume 12, Issue 46
September 2019
Pages 71-103

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